

GRZEGORZ ZBIŃKOWSKI
Warsaw
ORCID: 0000-0003-4993-5547

MIGRANT CRISIS IN THE EU AND ITS DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT DIRECTIONS OF POLAND'S MIGRATION POLICY AFTER 2018

INTRODUCTION

Migrations have been here since the beginning of human history. They form a “permanent element of world affairs, which has for years been deemed a major expression of spatial mobility and simultaneously an important aspect of human activity”¹. “Mass migrations have been occurring from the very dawn of history”². Why, though, is it so? What are the reasons? Migration theories discuss push and pull migration factors. Push factors include “unemployment, poverty, famine, discrimination, lack of various forms of freedom, poor health care, environmental hazards (natural disasters and environmental pollution), social and political hazards (wars and uprisings, state disintegration, high crime rates). Pull factors are: demand for labour, respect for civil liberties, high standards of social security, favourable weather and natural conditions, political and economic stability, high standards of national and international security”³.

The objectives of this paper are: (i) presentation of theoretical aspects of the phenomenon of migration and migrant crisis in the EU in 2015 (the causes of the crisis, the Vysehrad Group’s position on the issue and the status of the relocation process, including arrangements on strengthening the role and enhancing operating capacity of Frontex⁴; (ii) comparative analysis of selected demographic indicators for individual EU countries including Poland) / EU-28 in the context of the migrant crisis (fertility rate, mother’s mean age at first birth, death rate, as well as population in 1998–2018 and forecast until 2049); (iii) discussion of the following data concerning Poland: emigra-

¹ W. Fehler, K. Cebul, R. Podgórska, *Migracje jako wyzwanie dla Unii Europejskiej i wybranych państw członkowskich* [Migrations as a challenge to the European Union and selected member states], Difin SA, Warsaw 2017, p. 7.

² M. Dahl, *Europejski kryzys imigracyjny i jego konsekwencje dla Republiki Federalnej Niemiec – aspekty polityczne, społeczne i gospodarcze* [The European migrant crisis and its consequences to Germany – political, social and economic aspects], *Studia Polityczne* [Political Studies], No. 4(44), 2016, p. 261.

³ W. Fehler, K. Cebul, R. Podgórska, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

⁴ European Border and Coast Guard Agency.

tion, immigration, migration balance in 2006-2017 and labour deficit; (iv) presentation of Poland's migration policy (formal aspects, threats and opportunities, directions).

The author has decided to undertake research into the subject as he believes it has not yet been widely and satisfactorily covered in the literature in a way which would combine migration challenges (exemplified by the 2015 crisis), analysis of selected demographic indicators for individual EU countries on the background of the entire EU-28 and/or third countries through which migratory routes to the EU run and matters related to Poland's migration policy. Hence a presentation of the aspects identified above in a way just described is an added value of this paper, and thus an endeavour to fill the gap in the literature. The research objective is an attempt at answering the question of what the causes were of the 2015 migrant crisis and steps taken by the EU in response to the crisis; and what directions Poland's migration policy should take. The analysis assumes the following research hypothesis: a failure to introduce and implement a deliberate, multiyear migration policy, addressing the existing and future challenges will result in Poland's population decreasing by 3.44 million in 2019–2049. The hypothesis was verified by presenting Eurostat's forecasts, while also defining the following required directions of Poland's migration policy after 2018: (i) slowdown of the downward trend in the population through an increase in the replacement rate and reduction of the death rate (to no more than the EU-28 average), reduction of the mother's mean age at first birth; (ii) striving to achieve a positive migration balance (with emphasis on emigration reduction); (iii) support for remigrations; (iv) counteracting illegal immigration; (v) implementation of simple mechanisms and procedures for employing foreigners in Poland, which is expected to reduce the labour deficit; (vi) integration of foreigners. The hypothesis has been verified to be true. The following research methods were applied: the historical method (origin, progress, meaning) content analysis (research into documents), as well as the quantitative and qualitative method (numeric data analysis).

THEORETICAL ASPECTS

Given the various definitions concerning emigration, immigration and migration, these notions, as well as the notion of migration policy are explained below.

A migration policy is a "catalogue of instruments which are developed and maintained by a state or its agencies and include the both passive and active forms of immigration and emigration management"⁵. In the course of researching into migration,

⁵ Duszczyk M., *Wyzwania polskiej polityki migracyjnej a doświadczenia międzynarodowe [Challenges to Poland's migration policy and international experience]*, [in:] Kaczmarczyk P., Okólski M. (ed.), *Polityka migracyjna jako instrument promocji zatrudnienia i ograniczenia bezrobocia [Migration policy as a tool to promote employment and reduce unemployment]*, Centre of Migration Research of the Economics Faculty of Warsaw University, Warsaw 2008, p. 12.

Table 1

Explanation, meaning and associations of the notions of emigration, immigration and migration

Notion	Latin origin	Meaning	Association
Emigration	<i>emigrare</i> – to move out, to depart	the emigrants; a group of people who left their home country and live in another one	Emigration should be associated with departure.
Immigration	<i>immigrare</i> – to move into	taking permanent residence in a given country by foreigners; a group of people who have arrived in a given country and taken permanent residence there	Immigration should be associated with arrival.
Migration	<i>migrare</i> – to move, to change residence	changing place (country) of residence	Migration should be associated with moving from one place to another.

Source: Fehler W., Cebul K., Podgórska R., *Migracje jako wyzwanie dla Unii Europejskiej i wybranych państw członkowskich* [Migrations as a challenge to the European Union and selected member states in Polish], Difin SA, Warsaw 2017, p. 14, based on Tytuła M., Łosiak M., *Polski bez błędów. Poradnik językowy dla każdego* [Flawless Polish. Language Guide for Everyone – in Polish], Warsaw-Bielsko Biała 2008, pp. 62–63.

a number of theories have been drawn up. W. Janicki⁶ divided them into: economic theories (classical macroeconomic theory of migration, neo-classical theory of migration, new economic theory of migration, dual labour market theory and global system theory); sociological theories (migration network theory, institutional theory, accumulated causality theory, intervening opportunity theory and intervening obstacle theory); and geographic theories (gravitational theory and mobility transition theory). Given the limited size of this study, two gravitation theories will be discussed: Everett S. Lee's and Ernst Georg Ravenstein's. Ravenstein is considered a pioneer of research into migration. He was a German cartographer and geographer. "His activity coincided with the onset of the industrial era, which in the second half of the 19th century revolutionised the lives and work patterns of large populations in Europe and North America"⁷. He announced his theory in the paper *The Laws of Migration*⁸ published in 1885. He believed that it was the desire to improve their livelihoods that urged people to migrate. His beliefs inspired other people, including Everett S. Lee, who

⁶ For more detailed discussion, see: Janicki W., *Przegląd teorii migracji ludności* [Human migration theories – a review], *Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska*, Lublin – Polonia, Vol. LXII/14, Sectio B, 2007, pp. 285–304, http://dlibra.umcs.lublin.pl/dlibra/docmetadata?id=4027&from=&dirids=1&ver_id=&lp=1&QI=22266F76AB365B43F7AEDEF6A2259E3-5 (accessed on March 1st 2019).

⁷ W. Fehler, K. Cebul, R. Podgórska, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

⁸ E.G. Ravenstein, *The Laws of Migration*, *Journal of the Statistical Society of London*, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Jun., 1885), pp. 167–235.

in 1966 announced his concept of migration in the book *A Theory of Migration*⁹. The theory defines “the following four groups of the factors considered in the analysis of the migration process:

- 1) related to the home country (push factors),
- 2) related to the destination country (pull factors),
- 3) intervening obstacles,
- 4) personal factors”¹⁰.

Lee believes that while making a decision to migrate, a migrant is guided by the assessment of their then current situation in the home country and a comparison thereof with their subjective assessment of the situation in the destination country. Given the causes of the 2015 migrant crisis, the theory referred to above will provide valuable explanations.

MIGRANT CRISIS: CAUSES

Increased numbers of people coming to Europe were already recorded at the beginning of 2014, marking the onset of the mass immigration crisis, which peaked in 2015. Main reasons of the phenomenon include: deteriorating economic situation in Africa, the civil war in South Sudan (causing famine), political instability in the Middle East (civil war in Syria, operations of ISIS) and opening migratory routes in 2010–2013 in the wake of the Arab Spring. The three most commonly used migratory routes were: East Mediterranean route (from Turkey to Greece), Middle Mediterranean one (from Libya and Tunisia to Italy) and West Mediterranean route (from Morocco to Spain). “According to the UNHCR’s¹¹ report, over 60% of migrants who decided to move in the first five months of 2015 came from Syria, Somalia and Afghanistan, countries afflicted by war or omnipresent violence, or from Eritrea, controlled by one of most oppressive African governments¹²”. A substantial proportion of migrants came from Nigeria, Pakistan and Mali. The numbers of migrants-asylum applicants were as follows: 626,960 in 2014, 1,332,845 in 2015, 1,260,910 in 2016, 712,235 in 2017 and 639,475 in 2018¹³. “The European Union realised it urgently has to respond to the migrant crisis. The migration issue had been included in the list of

⁹ E.S. Lee, *A Theory of Migration*, Demography, 3, (1996), pp. 47-57.

¹⁰ W. Fehler, K. Cebul, R. Podgórskańska, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

¹¹ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

¹² S.K. Mazur, *Kryzys na granicach Europy i jego wpływ na strukturę Unii Europejskiej w l. 2011-2015 [Crisis at Europe's borders and its effect on the EU's structure in 2011-2015]*, [in:] Mazur Sylwia K. (ed.), *Unia Europejska a migracje: szanse i wyzwania [The European Union and migration: opportunities and challenges]*, European Information Centre Europe Direct – Rzeszów, Rzeszów 2015, p. 10, http://www.europe-direct.rzeszow.pl/?page_id=19 (accessed on March 1st 2019).

¹³ Based on Eurostat’s data, *Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex. Annual aggregated data (rounded)*, <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDownloads.do> (accessed on March 1st 2019).

the European Commission's ten priorities before Jean-Claude Juncker became the President of the Commission in November 2014. The action plan was presented in the form of the European Agenda on Migration on May 13th 2015.¹⁴ The Agenda provides for immediate and long-term actions¹⁵.

MIGRANT CRISIS: THE VYSEHRAD GROUP'S POSITION AND THE STATUS OF THE RELOCATION PROCESS

On September 22nd 2015, the Council¹⁶ adopted a decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece¹⁷, effective until September 26th 2017. The decision was, however, not adopted unanimously. At the meeting of EU Foreign Affairs Ministers, Poland voted for (5,082 people were to have been relocated to Poland¹⁸), while Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania were against. Thus the Vysehrad Group countries did not vote in concert. By its ruling of September 6th 2017, The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) rejected a petition for declaring the decision invalid, submitted by Slovakia and Hungary on December 2nd and 3rd 2015, respectively (and supported by Poland). As at April 30th 2018, 28.92% of the 120 thousand people planned to be relocated had actually been relocated¹⁹.

MIGRANT CRISIS: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE AND ENHANCING OPERATING CAPACITY OF THE EUROPEAN BORDER AND COAST GUARD AGENCY (FRONTEX)

Given the challenges posed by the 2015 migrant crisis, since September 2015 arrangements have been made concerning, in particular, strengthening control on the EU external border, as well as "enhancing Frontex's competences in order to cre-

¹⁴ Morozowski T., *Działania Komisji Europejskiej wobec kryzysu migracyjnego* [The European Commission's response to the migrant crisis], Biuletyn Instytutu Zachodniego, Seria Specjalna – „Refugees in Europe”, No. 224/2016, p. 1, pp. 2-3, <https://www.iz.poznan.pl/szukaj?s=Dzia%C5%82ania+Komisji+Europejskiej+wobec+kryzysu+migracyjnego> (accessed on March 1st 2019).

¹⁵ For a more detailed discussion of these actions, see: Morozowski T., *Działania Komisji Europejskiej (...), op. cit.*, pp. 2–3.

¹⁶ The Council of the European Union.

¹⁷ See: *COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece*, Official Journal of the European Union, L 248/80, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2015.248.01.0080.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2015:248:TOC (accessed on March 1st 2019).

¹⁸ Without the obligation under proportionate allocation of 54 thousand people.

¹⁹ Including 3,019 people relocated to Norway, Switzerland and Lichtenstein. The author's analysis as at October 30th 2018 based on: *Member States' Support to Emergency Relocation Mechanism*, https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/press-material/docs/state_of_play_-_relocation_en.pdf (accessed on March 1st 2019).

ate an integrated border management system”²⁰. This led to issuing Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard²¹. Further, on April 1st 2019, “EU ambassadors [today] confirmed on behalf of the Council the informal agreement reached between representatives of the European Parliament and the Romanian Presidency of the Council on a regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard²². The new rules were formally adopted by the European Parliament and the Council on November 13th 2019²³, thanks to which the renamed European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is being strengthened in terms of staff and technical equipment²⁴. It has also been given a broader mandate to support member states’ activities on border protection, return and cooperation with third countries. The proposed new rules will incorporate the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) into the Frontex framework, to improve its functioning.”²⁵ These changes will have been introduced gradually by the end of 2027.

²⁰ J.J. Węc, *Reforma polityki imigracyjnej, kontroli granic zewnętrznych oraz polityki azylowej Unii Europejskiej w dobie kryzysu migracyjnego (2015–2016)* [*Reform of immigration policy, external border control and the EU asylum policy in the time of migration crisis (2015-2016)*], Przegląd Zachodni 2017, No. 2, p. 22.

²¹ See: *REGULATION (EU) 2016/1624 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 14 September 2016 on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC*, Official Journal of the European Union L 251/1 of 16 September 2016, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016R1624> (accessed on April 1st 2019). For a more detailed information, see: J.J. Węc, *Reforma polityki...*, p. 23.

²² See: *the Proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council – A contribution from the European Commission to the Leaders’ meeting in Salzburg on 19-20 September 2018*, COM (2018) 631 final, Brussels, 12.09.2018, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0631&from> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

²³ See: *REGULATION (EU) 2019/1896 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 November 2019 on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Regulations (EU) No 1052/2013 and (EU) 2016/1624*, European Union Official Journal L 295/1 of November 14th 2016, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32019R1896&from=EN> (accessed on January 25th 2020).

²⁴ See: *ANNEXES to the proposal for a REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the European Border and Coast Guard and repealing Council Joint Action n°98/700/JHA, Regulation (EU) n° 1052/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EU) n° 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council*, COM (2018) 631 final, ANNEXES 1–6, Brussels, 12.09.2018, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52018PC0631&from=PL> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

²⁵ Press release of the Council of the EU of April 1st 2019, *European Border and Coast Guard: Council confirms agreement on stronger mandate*, <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/04/01/european-border-and-coast-guard-council-confirms-agreement-on-stronger-mandate/> (accessed on April 5th 2019).

SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR INDIVIDUAL EU COUNTRIES / EU-28
AND THE MIGRANT CRISIS

While analysing comparative demographic data for individual EU countries (including Poland) / for EU-28, such as fertility rate, the mother's mean age at first birth, death rate and population in 1998–2018 together with population forecast until 2049, one should include the migrant crisis in the analysis, as individual regions/countries through which migratory routes into the EU run record demographic indicators more favourable than EU countries, which may drive migration pressure. Depending on the data analysed, comparison will cover individual EU countries (Poland²⁶, Germany, France, Spain and Italy have been selected, given the geographical location and similar area; they will hereinafter be referred to as the “covered countries”), EU-28, regions of the world or some third countries.

The fertility rate is defined as the average number of children born per a woman in a reproductive age (15–49). It is assumed that the fertility rate over 2.1 (replacement rate) guarantees sustaining population levels. In the event of this rate, the comparison included not only the covered countries, but also the Russian Federation and selected regions of the world²⁷. For the Russian Federation, the fertility rate increased from 1.57 in 2010 to 1.75 in 2016. In the selected regions of the world indicator dynamics between 2010 and 2016 were as follows: Sub-Saharan Africa – drop from 5.24 to 4.84, the Middle East and North Africa – drop from 2.88 to 2.80, East Asia and Pacific – rise from 1.79 to 1.80. We should bear in mind the values just quoted, while interpreting the fertility rates for the covered countries and the EU-28 for 2008–2017 presented in the chart below:

The chart shows that in 2008–2017, the fertility rate increased in Germany from 1.38 to 1.57 and in Poland from 1.39 to 1.48, while it decreased in Spain from 1.45 to 1.31, Italy from 1.45 to 1.32 and France from 2.01 to 1.90, but even there it was still higher than the EU-28 average, which went down from 1.61 to 1.59. In the case of the mother's mean age at first birth, in addition to the covered countries, the comparison included certain third countries²⁸, for which the following data were obtained: Afghanistan – 19.9 (in 2015), Cameroon – 19.7 (in 2011), Ethiopia – 20.0 (in 2016), Kenya – 20.3 (in 2014), Chad – 17.9 (in 2014/15), Eritrea – 21.3 (in 2010) and Pakistan – 23.6 (in 2017/18). The mother's mean age at first birth in the covered countries in 2013–2017 increased as follows: in Poland from 26.7 to 27.3, in Germany from 29.3 to 29.6, on Spain from 30.4 to 30.9, in France from 28.1 to 28.7 and in Italy from 30.6 to 31.1. The chart below presents the indicator for the covered countries in 2013–2017.


²⁶ The results of this analysis are included in the discussion of threats and opportunities and then in the directions of Poland's migration policy.

²⁷ The World Bank – IBRD – IDA, *Fertility rate, total (births per woman)*, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN> (accessed on March 1st 2019).

²⁸ *The World Factbook, Mother's mean age at first birth, Central Intelligence Agency*, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/352.html> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

Chart 1


Fertility rates for Poland, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and EU-28 in 2008-2017



Source: Author's analysis based on Eurostat, *Total fertility rate*, <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

Chart 2

Mother's mean age at first birth in Poland, Germany, France, Italy, Spain and EU-28 in 2013-2017




Source: Author's study based on Eurostat, *Mean age of woman at birth of first child*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/refreshTableAction.do?sessionId=t4J0dbhWMoV3pT5BuUCm15Tf90OpIpG4APvQmyeUQm5I-smK5P!27575412?tab=table&plugin=1&pcode=tps00017&language=en> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

The chart reveals that the EU-28 mean is higher than the respective figure for the third countries included in the analysis. This, combined with higher fertility rates in various world regions and the fact that it is through those regions that migratory routes into EU-28 run, may trigger migration pressure, which may in turn transform into a crisis.

The death rate is understood as the number of deaths among people aged below 65 per 100,000 inhabitants. Among the covered countries, Poland records the highest death rate, despite the fact that in 2011–2015 it went down by 23.30 (to 287.22 in 2015), against the EU-28 average of 199.33 for that year. The drops for the covered countries and the EU-28 average are shown in the chart below.

Chart 3

Death rates for Poland, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, and EU-28 average in 2011–2015




Source: Author's analysis based on Eurostat, *Causes of death – standardised death rate by residence [hlth_cd_asdr2]*, age below 65, <http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/setupDownloads.do> (accessed on March 1st 2019).

The chart below presents historical data on population numbers in 1988–2018.

In the period covered by the data, the population grew in all of the covered countries; however, the increase was lowest in Poland (+0.22m), which is an insignificant value compared with the respective figures for Germany (+4.89m), France (+9.58m), Italy (+3.87m) and Spain (+7.93m). Population forecasts for the covered countries for 2019–2049 are not hope-infusing for Poland, either, and are as follows:

Chart 4


Population of Poland, Germany²⁹, France, Italy and Spain in 1998-2018



Source: Author's analysis based on Eurostat, *Population change – Demographic balance and crude rates at national level [demo_gind]*, total population as at January 1st, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/visualisations> (accessed on March 1st 2019).

Chart 5

Population forecasts for Poland, Germany, France, Italy and Spain in 2019–2049.



Source: Author's analysis based on Eurostat, *Population on 1st January by age, sex and type of projection [proj_15npms]*, total population as at January 1st, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/population-demography-migration-projections/visualisations> (accessed on March 1st 2019).

²⁹ Data includes the West and East Germany.


It is Poland that will see the largest population drop among the covered countries (-3.44m). Drops will also be experienced by Germany (-0.65m) and Italy (-1.62m), while increases will be recorded in Spain (+2.66m) and France (+6.72m). The same source data reveals that the EU-28 population will grow (+14.34m).

POLAND: EMIGRATION, IMMIGRATION AND MIGRATION BALANCE IN 2006–2017

While analysing emigration and immigration data, and thus also the migration balance, one should bear in mind that the information analysed is based on Eurostat's official data and does not include what is called illegal immigration. The data presented below reveals that in Poland the emigration and immigration volumes started to grow in 2008, to peak in 2013 in the case of emigration and 2014 in the case of immigration. In the period covered by analysis, 2.359 million people emigrated from and 1.838 million people immigrated to Poland, which adds up to the negative migration balance of -0.521 million. The chart below presents the data for individual years in the period analysed.

Chart 6

Immigrants, emigrants and migration balance for Poland in 2006–2017



Source: Author's study based on Eurostat, *Total number of long-term emigrants leaving from the reporting country during the reference year*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00177> (accessed on April 5th 2019) and *Total number of long-term immigrants arriving into the reporting country during the reference year*, <https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00176> (accessed on April 5th 2019).

A material issue concerns Ukrainian citizens. In 2014–2016, they obtained 3.025 million Polish visas, including 1.278 million working visas. Having entered the territory of Poland, as little as 28% of Ukrainian immigrants reported for work at the

employer indicated in the visa application. The remaining 72% did not take a legal job in Poland³⁰. The data on the number of Ukrainian citizens present in Poland is also provided in Selectivv's report³¹. The report summarised the research into those users of mobile phones with a Polish operator's SIM card and the Ukrainian or Russian language chosen who at least once in 2018 were in Ukraine or replaced their SIM card for a Ukrainian operator's one in that year. Based on these criteria, the number of Ukrainian citizens staying in Poland in 2018 was determined at 1,270 million³².

POLAND: LABOUR DEFICIT

A labour deficit is a factor that must be included in Poland's migration policy. "PwC's³³ estimates reveal that until 2025 the deficit on the Polish labour market may reach 1.5 million people. This means each year over 300 thousand employees must additionally be hired. The authors of the report emphasise that the growing gap in the Polish labour market follows from adverse demographic trends and Poles emigrating from the country to earn a living. The current situation may be further aggravated by the fact that some foreigners active on the Polish labour market might soon leave for Germany, where numerous incentives and privileges for non-EU immigrants have recently been implemented"³⁴. The labour deficit affects the economic growth dynamics in general, as well as the investment growth dynamics.

POLAND: FORMAL ASPECTS OF MIGRATION POLICY

Poland has no effective migration policy document approved by the Council of Ministers. While on October 31st 2012 the Polish Council of Ministers approved "Poland's Migration Policy – the Current Status and Suggested Steps"³⁵ and "Implemen-

³⁰ Data from the Supreme Audit Office's (NIK's) post-inspection report: *Zabezpieczenie przed wyludzeniem wiz pod pretekstem podejmowania pracy przez cudzoziemców na terenie Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej* [Protection against attempted visa beguiling on the pretence of foreigners' taking jobs in Poland], March 12th 2019, <https://www.nik.gov.pl/aktualnosci/bezpieczenstwo/nik-o-wydawaniu-wiz-pracowniczych-obywatelom-ukrainy.html> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

³¹ A company involved in the research into mobile phone users' habits and behaviours.

³² S. Czubkowska, *Smartfony policzyły Ukraińców. Ile Ukrainek planuje mieć dzieci?* [Smartphones have counted Ukrainians. How many Ukrainian women plan pregnancy?], wyborcza.pl, March 7th 2019, <http://wyborcza.pl/7,156282,24522397,smartfony-policzyly-ukraincow-ile-ukrainek-planuje-miec-dzieci.html> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

³³ PricewaterhouseCoopers – a consultancy, auditing and accounting services company.

³⁴ Raport PwC: *Na polskim rynku pracy do 2025 r. może brakować nawet 1,5 mln osób* [By 2025, the deficit on the Polish labour market may reach as many as 1.5m people], January 18th 2019, <https://www.pwc.pl/pl/media/2019/2019-01-22-luka-rynek-pracy-2025-pwc.html> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

³⁵ The document was divided into the following ten sections: 1) Legal immigration, 2) Preventing illegal immigration, 3) Protection of foreigners in Poland, 4) Integration of foreigners, 5) Citizenship and repatriation, 6) Economic emigration – remigration, 7) Streamlined operation of the legal and institutional systems, 8) International considerations of Poland's migration policy, 9) Interrelations of

tation Plan for Poland's Migration Policy – the Current Status and Suggested Steps”, the both documents were repealed by the Council of Ministers on October 18th 2016³⁶. In March 2018 the Council of Ministers approved “Social and Economic Priorities of Migration Policy”. The document indicates that a migration policy should primarily focus on (i) complementing labour resources with foreign human capital in those industries/professions where competence gaps are observed, with due consideration of domestic labour market protection, as well as (ii) encouraging remigration³⁷. Then, on December 19th 2018, in his response to the Polish Ombudsman's moving concerning the progress of work on Poland's Migration Policy³⁸, the Minister of Home Affairs and Administration wrote: “In 2019, in line with the Minister of Internal Affairs and Administration's operating plan for 2019 (published in the webpage of Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej MSWiA [Public Information Bulletin of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration], the final draft of ‘Poland's Migration Policy’ is planned to be prepared and approved by the Inter-Ministerial Team for Migration Matters, and the Council of Ministers' draft resolution on the migration policy is planned to be prepared”. The initial concept of Poland's migration policy is included in a document dated June 10th 2019³⁹, which, however, has been neither officially published by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration⁴⁰, nor approved. Currently, the effective law governing migration issues includes the Foreigners Act of December 12th 2013 (as amended) and secondary legislation thereto.

POLAND: MIGRATION POLICY – OPPORTUNITIES AND THREATS

In discussing opportunities and threats, one should bear in mind that each well managed challenge may become an opportunity, while each poorly managed one may turn out to be a threat. Further, a given factor may prove both opportunity and threat.

Poland's migration policy with other policies, 10) Migration process monitoring, http://emn.gov.pl/download/75/12409/Polityka_migracyjna_Polski_stan_obecny_i_postulowane_dzialania.pdf (accessed on April 1st 2019).

³⁶ See: the Minister of Home Affairs and Administration's response of September 1st 2017 to the Polish Ombudsman's moving of August 1st 2017 concerning the progress of work on ratifying the *Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness* and the *Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons*, file No. BMP-0790-2-6/2017/MJ, accessible at: <https://www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Odpowied%C5%BA%20MSWiA%20na%20pytanie%20o%20konwencj%C4%99%20ostatusie%20bezpa%C5%84stwowo%C3%B3w%201.09.2017.pdf> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

³⁷ The document is accessible at: <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/?action=media.download&uuid=6EE4C9A8-B9E2-D589-0D6988597C7217B6> (accessed on April 1st 2019).

³⁸ Letter No. BMP/0790/2-8/2018/MJ, accessible at: <https://www.rpo.gov.pl/sites/default/files/Odpowied%C5%BA%20MSWiA%2019.12.2018.pdf>, (accessed on April 1st 2019).

³⁹ Polish Press Agency's press release of June 26th 2019, *Polityka migracyjna ma skupiać się na bieżących potrzebach rynku pracy [The migration policy has to focus on current needs of the labour market]*, <https://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/news%2C474491%2Cpolityka-migracyjna-ma-skupiac-sie-na-biezacych-potrzebach-ryнку-pracy>, (accessed on July 1st 2019).

⁴⁰ The draft of the document (together with a commentary) accessible (in Polish) at: <https://www.hfhr.pl/politykamigracyjnepolski/>, (accessed on January 25th 2020).

Taking into consideration the analysis carried out herein, the author suggests the following classification of opportunities and threats to be addressed in Poland's migration policy:

Table 2
Poland's migration policy – opportunities and threats until 2049

Opportunities	Threats
Fertility rate growing since 2016 (2015: 1.32; 2016: 1.39; 2017: 1.48)	Population increasing only slowly in 1988–2018 (+0.22m)
Mean age of woman at birth of first child (27.3) lower than the EU-28 average (29.1) (data for 2017)	Forecast decrease in Poland's population (-3.42m in 2019–2049)
Immigrant number decreasing since 2015	Death rate for Poland (287.22) higher than the EU-28 average (199.33)
Strengthening Frontex's role and enhancing its operating capacity (support of Straż Graniczna (Polish Border Guard) in the event of unexpected developments in Ukraine, resulting in mass immigration to Poland and/or opening of new migratory routes from countries other than Ukraine)	Labour deficit in Poland (until 2025, the deficit will have reached 1.5m people)
	No official migration policy in Poland since October 18th 2016
	Lack of even symbolic solidarity within the EU on the relocation issue (no migrant accepted, while, for instance, the Czech Republic accepted 12 migrants relocated from Greece and Slovakia accepted 16).
	Ukrainian citizens avoiding taking a legal job after crossing the Polish border with a working visa (in 2014–2016, 72% of entrants did not report to work arranged).

Source: The author's own study.

POLAND: DIRECTIONS OF MIGRATION POLICY AFTER 2018

The author suggests the following directions of Poland's migration policy:

- (i) deceleration of the decrease rate for Poland's population through: increase in the replacement rate, reduction of the death rate (to at most the EU-28 average), decrease in mother's mean age at first birth;
- (ii) striving to obtain a positive migration balance (with emigration reduction prioritised);
- (iii) support for remigration;
- (iv) preventing illegal immigration;
- (v) implementation of simple mechanisms and procedures for employing foreigners in Poland, with resulting reduction of labour deficit;
- (vi) integration of foreigners.

CONCLUSION

The adopted research hypothesis saying that “a failure to introduce and implement a deliberate, multiyear migration policy, addressing the existing and future challenges will result in Poland's population decreasing by 3.44 million in 2019–2049” has been verified to be true. The research result is a list of opportunities and threats to be addressed in Poland's migration policy, as well as directions for the policy after 2018. Poland's security should be prioritised, which does not exclude solidarity with other EU countries on this issue, because it cannot be excluded that someday Poland will need the assistance now sought by Italy or Greece.

The analysis proved that: (i) the fertility rates for the covered EU countries are below the replacement rate (assumed to be in the range 2.1–2.15); (ii) in EU-28, mother's mean age at first birth has been growing (to 29.1 in 2017), while the death rate has been decreasing (to 199.33 in 2015); (iii) EU-28 population will increase by 14.34 million by 2049.

Suggested subjects of further research: (i) macro-analysis of risk⁴¹, as it has been presented herein that other countries/regions enjoy much higher fertility rates or much lower mother's mean age at first birth, when compared with the relevant EU-28 averages, and it is through those countries or regions that migratory routes to Europe run; (ii) preparation of suggested remedial initiatives to be implemented in third countries with a view to materially reduce migration pressure.

Grzegorz Zbińkowski, doktorant w Instytucie Nauk Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Warszawa (grzegorz.zbinkowski@doktorantispnan.pl)

Słowa kluczowe: kryzys uchodźczy w UE, kierunki polskiej polityki migracyjnej, populacja, śmiertelność, wskaźnik urodzeń, emigracja, migracja, równowaga migracyjna, Frontex, bezrobocie

Keywords: EU migrant crisis, directions of Poland's migration policy, population, death rate, fertility rate, emigration, migration, migration balance, Frontex, labour deficit

ABSTRACT

The objectives of this paper are: (i) presentation of theoretical aspects of migration and migrant crisis in the EU in 2015 (its causes, the V4 group's position on the issue and the status of the relocation process, including the arrangements on strengthening the role and enhancing operating capacity of Frontex); (ii) comparative analysis of selected demographic indicators for individual EU countries (including Poland) / EU-28 in the context of the migrant crisis: fertility rate, mother's mean age at first birth, death rate and population in 1998-2018 together with the population forecast until 2049; (iii) discussion of the following data for Poland: emigration-immigration-migration balance in 2006-2017 and labour deficit; (iv) presentation of Poland's migration policy (its formal aspects, threats and opportunities, directions). The research objective is an answer to the question of what the causes were of the 2015 migrant crisis and steps taken by the EU in this scope; and what directions Poland's migration policy

⁴¹ I.e. covering the entire EU-28.

should take. The analysis assumes the following research hypothesis: “a failure to introduce and implement a deliberate, multiyear migration policy, addressing the existing and future challenges will result in Poland’s population decreasing by 3.44 million in 2019-2049”. The hypothesis was verified through presenting Eurostat’s forecasts with the simultaneous definition of required directions of Poland’s migration policy after 2018, that is: (i) deceleration of the decrease rate for Poland’s population through: increase in the replacement rate, reduction of the death rate (to at most the EU-28 average) and decrease in mother’s mean age at first birth; (ii) striving to obtain a positive migration balance (with emigration reduction prioritised); (iii) support for remigration; (iv) preventing illegal immigration; (v) implementation of simple mechanisms and procedures for employing foreigners in Poland, with resulting reduction of labour deficit; (vi) integration of foreigners. The hypothesis has been verified to be true. The following research methods were applied: the historical method (origin, progress, meaning), content analysis (research into documents), as well as the quantitative and qualitative method (numeric data analysis).